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Over the last two decades, society has witnessed tremendous
growth in the legal concepts of products liability. This growth
and its accompanying turmoil have been the result of three pri-
mary factors:' (1) the development of the rule of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.2 extending manufacturers', contractors' and
vendors' liability for negligence related to product- and work-
caused injuries to persons outside the contractual relationship;
(2) the expansion by statutes and judicial decisions of the war-
ranty liability of manufacturers and vendors to third persons;
3
(3) the effectuation by judicial decision' and legislative enact-
ment ' of strict liability in tort. In our modern society, potential
for injury has so increased that it is difficult to conceive of an
American who is not exposed to some type of product-related
injury. The owner, vendor, distributor and manufacturer of the
source likewise are exposed to a correlative liability.' Such
liability may arise in negligence, breach of warranty or strict
liability in tort. As this trend towaid stricter liability continues,'
1. [1979] 1 PROD. LisB. REP. (CCH) T 3500.
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
4. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962).
5. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976).
6. See generally Hendersen, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Com-
pleted Operations-What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REv. 415 (1971).
7. Tennessee recently enacted a statute imposing strict liability in tort. TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-3705, -3706 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
The proposed draft of the Uniform Products Liability Act states as follows:
[I]t is important to understand the basic philosophy that underlies the model
product liability law. Product liability law is a branch of the law of torts. The
function of tort law is to shift the cost of an accident from a claimant to a
defendant when that person is deemed "responsible" for the claimant's inju-
ries. This responsibility should be defined in terms that everyone can under-
stand. It should indicate why a particular individual product seller should bear
the cost of that injury.
Tort law is not a compensation system similar to Social Security or Worker
Compensation. A product seller is not being asked to pay merely because his
product caused an injury. If that were the case, it would be far more efficient
and less expensive to make purchasers of products third-party beneficiaries of
product sellers' insurance policies and provide a limited damages recovery, as
is the case with other compensation systems. In sum, product liability law
should impose liability only where it is fair to deem the product seller responsi-
1
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businessmen increasingly have become interested in protecting
themselves against the serious financial burden that accompa-
nies the potential liability from product claims. The result has
been that products liability insurance swiftly has become one of
the major forms of liability insurance.'
The insurance industry has sought to keep abreast of these
changes in the field of products liability. The increase in prod-
ucts liability litigation has caused insurers to give particular at-
tention to the problems that arise when a products liability case
is litigated and coverage questions are raised.' The insurance in-
dustry has refined descriptions of the circumstances under which
the risk of loss resulting from products and operations will be
insured.10 The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
adopted the revised standard provisions for Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability (CGL) insurance, which became effective October
1, 1966." It is these revisions, among others, 2 that this Note will
address. It should be emphasized that the phrase "products lia-
bility insurance," will be used in its broadest sense encompass-
ing not only liability insurance for consumer product-related in-
juries, but also similar insurance for builders, contractors and
other providers of product-related operations.
Primary focus will be on the cases that construe those provi-
sions of the standard products liability policy that were intro-
duced or revised in 1966. To understand and appreciate fully
these revisions and interpretations, however, a brief analysis of
the development of, and the problems that plagued, the pre-1966
ble for an injury.
44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2997 (1979).
8. Andersen, Current Problems in Products Liability Law and Products Liability In-
surance, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 436, 441 (1964). "In the present climate of the law, many
modern manufacturers have retreated from their former status as self-insurers. Products
liability insurance, cautiously and hesitantly written shortly before the mid-twenties, as
the result of demands of manufacturers for coverage, now has become a major phase of
insurance underwriting." Miller, Liability of a Manufacturer for Harm Done by a Prod-
uct, 3 SYRACUSE L. REv. 106, 124 (1951).
9. Andersen, supra note 8, at 436.
10. Sorensen, The New Comprehensive General Liability Policy's Products Liability
Coverage, 1966 INs. L.J. 645, 645.
11. See Elliott, The New Comprehensive General Liability Policy, in LIABiLrrY IN-
SURANCE DispuTEs 12-3 (S. Schreiber ed. 1968).
12. In 1973 the standard CGL policy was again amended, although to a lesser extent
than in 1966. The major 1973 changes were the inclusion, unless specifically excluded, of
products-hazard and completed-operations coverages and a rewording of the business-risk
exclusion. See 1 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LiABimrry INSURANCE § 11.01 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
1980] 719
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standard policy is in order. Attention will then shift to the prod-
ucts-hazard and completed-operations provisions as they appear
after October 1966, as well as to various exclusions that were in-
troduced or reworded at that time. This Note also will treat the
ways in which courts have addressed coverage issues dealing
with time of loss and warranties. The author hopes that through
a better understanding of the provisions and the ways in which
they are currently being construed by the courts, the practitioner
will be able to effectively advise the business client in his or her
search for affordable yet comprehensive coverage against prod-
uct- and service-related claims.
I. DEVELOPMENT
The development of insurance protection for products liabil-
ity has coincided with the development of modern tort theories
of products liability.' One writer states that the first products
liability insurance, known as poison insurance, was written in
England around 1890 to insure pie bakers against liability for ac-
cidents that occurred when roach powder inadvertently got into
the pie dough.'4 It was not until the late 1930s, however, that the
common law in this area began to develop and products liability
insurance began its rise to prominence as one of the major forms
of liability insurance. 5 Prior to this time, there simply was little
need for such insurance coverage. Before the creation of liability
for injuries arising from unreasonably dangerous products, the
manufacturer could be sued only for negligence or breach of war-
ranty." Furthermore, even if the plaintiff could obtain the neces-
sary evidence to sustain a claim for breach of warranty, until
recently he had to contend with the privity barrier. 7 The great-
est risk that a manufacturer might face, aside from liability to
13. Hendersen, supra note 6, at 416. Several cases have pointed out the develop-
ment. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 224 F.2d 293 (3d Cir.
1955); Nielson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 174 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Iowa 1959), aff'd, 277
F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1960).
14, Andersen, supra note 8, at 441.
15. Id.
16. Hendersen, supra note 6, at 417.
17. In Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co., 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E. 2d 831 (1978), the South
Carolina Supreme Court, interpreting S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976), dispensed with
the need for contractual privity between a component part manufacturer and a plaintiff
in cases of injury and damage to person or property. See generally Products Liability,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. REv. 101, 101-05 (1979).
[Vol. 31
3
Harvey: Products Liability Insurance Coverage
Published by Scholar Commons, 1980
PRODUCTS LiABiLrrY INSURANCE
employees, "was for injuries to third persons arising out of opera-
tions or activities on or near his premises and for operations
away from such premises but related thereto."'" This liability
arising from activities in progress was covered by public liability
policies, readily available under the "Premises and Operations"
coverage."5
If, however, the injury arose after completion of the work or
operations, and away from the described premises, there was no
coverage. 0 Therefore, with the rise of strict liability and the fall
of the privity requirements, an additional coverage became nec-
essary. The insurance industry responded with products-hazard
coverage, which dealt with two product-oriented situations: (1)
injuries, arising from goods or products, that occur away from
the insured's premises and after the insured has relinquished
possession of the products; and (2) injuries resulting from opera-
tions occurring away from the insured's premises and after the
operation has been completed. The industry chose to place both
coverages under the heading "Products Hazard," which, as will
be shown below, caused confusion and differences of opinion in
the courts, as well as among even the most reputable
underwriters. 2'
II. PRE-1966 PRODUCTS LuB-.rry INSURANCE
The principles that the courts used and the problems they
experienced in addressing pre-1966 policy coverage issues still
play a significant role in construing the revised policy language.
Thus, it is necessary to analyze briefly how courts dealt with
these pre-1966 principles and problems.
For more than twenty years prior to 1966, the products-haz-
ard coverage provision of the ordinary standard liability policy
was very similar, if not identical, to the following:
Products Hazard
(1) The handling or use of, the existence of any condition
18. Hendersen, supra note 6, at 417.
19. For a general discussion of premises and operations coverage, see 7A J. Ap-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4493.2-.3 (1962).
20. See, e.g., Kelly-Dempsey & Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 77 F.2d 85 (10th Cir.
1935); Graustein & Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 214 Mass. 421, 101 N.E. 1073
(1913); Camden & Atl. Tel. Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 227 Pa. 242, 75 A. 1077 (1910).
21. Callahan, "Completed Operations" Exclusions in General Liability Policies, 1
FORUM 16, 16 & n.1 (Jan. 1966).
1980]
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in or a warranty of goods or products manufactured, sold, han-
dled or distributed by the named insured, other than equip-
ment rented to or located for use of others but not sold, if the
accident occurs after the insured has relinquished possession
thereof to others and away from the premises owned, or con-
trolled by the insured or on the premises for which the classifi-
cation in division 1 of the declarations excludes any part of the
foregoing;
(2) Operations: If the accident occurs after such opera-
tions have been completed or abandoned at the place of the
occurrence thereof and away from the premises owned, rented
or controlled by the insured, except (a) pickup and delivery,
(b) the existence of tools, uninstalled equipment and aban-
doned or unused materials and (c) operations for which the
classification stated in division 1 of the declarations specifically
includes completed operations; provided, operations shall not
be deemed incomplete because improperly or defectively per-
formed or because further operations may be required pursuant
to a service or maintenance agreement. "
This coverage was not automatically incorporated as part of the
general comprehensive liability policy. Rather, the manufac-
turer, vendor, or others engaged in the sale and distribution of
products or the supply of an operation had to purchase this cov-
erage for an additional premium. When this additional premium
was paid, the products-hazard coverage was included, nor-
mally by endorsements or riders.2?
In interpreting and applying the coverage in the first para-
graph of the "Products-Hazard" division, courts encountered lit-
tle difficulty since the meaning and intent of this subdivision
were unambiguous. The exclusion of subdivision (1) coverage re-
lieved the insurer of the duty to defend and pay judgment when
the insured was sued in strict liability, negligence or breach of
warranty, if the accident out of which the suit arose occurred
after the insured had relinquished possession of the injury-caus-
ing merchandise and the injury occurred away from the insured
premises. 4 If the product had not been relinquished or had not
22. [1979] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 3530.
23. Id.
24. Id. 3526. See also Bitts v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 282 F.2d 542
(9th Cir. 1960)(exploding refrigerator); Orchard v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 564
(D. Or. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1965)(sale of wrong axle bearing); Lyman
Lumber & Coal Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 494, 289 N.W. 40 (1939)(shipment of
[Vol. 31
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been removed from the insured's premises, the exclusion was in-
applicable and claims for bodily injury and property damage
caused by the product fell under the coverage provided by the
insured's premises and operations policy.2"
The construction and application of the coverage provided
in subdivision (2) of the "Products-Hazard" division, however,
caused problems for courts. The purpose of the exclusion of com-
pleted operations, if products-hazard coverage was not purchased
additionally, was to relieve the insurer of the duty to defend and
pay judgment on suits arising out of accidents that occurred af-
ter the insured had finished the "operation," even though the
accident resulted from some negligent act or omission committed
while the work was actually in progress. 2 The definitions of "op-
erations" and "use or handling" of products somewhat overlap,
since the use or handling of goods or products that an insured
manufactures, sells, handles, or distributes necessarily includes
some form of operation. The courts found no difficulty in deter-
mining what was meant or intended by the completed-operations
exclusion when the cases before them involved only the manu-
facture, sale or distribution of a "product.""1 Not all operations,
however, involve a product and herein lay the difficulty. The
courts were unable to agree on the scope of the completed-opera-
tions exclusion when applied to pure service operations. In Niel-
son v. Travelers Indemnity Co.2s the court aptly described the
dilemma:
Where the transaction involves . . . the erection of a structure
and the contractor furnishes material for the structure, greater
difficulty is encountered as to the liability insurance coverage
under the products hazard provision. However, when the con-
tract involves .. .the rendering of services which do not in-
coal); Inductotherm Corp. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas. Co., 83 N.J. Super. 464, 200 A.2d 358
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964)(defective crucibles); Blohm v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 231 Or.
410, 373 P.2d 412 (1962)(defective lawn mower).
25. Such coverage was also provided in "Owners, Landlords and Tenants," "Manu-
facturers and Contractors," "Schedule Liability" and "Garage Liability" policies. 1 R.
LONG, supra note 12, § 11.01 (1978); Arnold, Products Liability Insurance, 1957 Wis. L.
REv. 429, 430 (1957).
26. [1979] 1 PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) 3530.
27. E.g., Smedley Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 143 Conn. 510, 123 A.2d 755
(1956); Cobbins v. General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Co., 53 Ill. 2d 285, 290 N.E.2d 873
(1972).
28. 174 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Iowa 1959), aff'd, 227 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1960).
1980]
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volve the furnishing or supplying of any product or material,
the question of liability insurance coverage under the products
hazard provision becomes most difficult.
29
Since the coverage afforded by a liability insurance policy is
measured not by what is given by the insuring agreement, but
rather by what is left after all the exclusionary provisions have
been given proper effect,30 courts had to find some way to deal
with the problem. Some simply gave up, as did the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals when it was faced with the question of the
insurer's liability under the completed-operations clause for the
negligence of the insured contractor:
The true meaning of the policy is difficult to determine. An ex-
amination of it involves a physical effort of no mean propor-
tions. Starting out with three printed pages, the first of which
consists largely of a form which is filled in on a typewriter, the
reader is confronted also with six physically attached supple-
ments, or riders, inconveniently assorted into different sizes. If
he is possessed of reasonable physical dexterity, coupled with
average mental capacity, he may then attempt to integrate and
harmonize the dubious meanings to be found in this not incon-
siderable package. A confused attempt to set forth an assuring
agreement is later assailed by such a bewildering array of ex-
clusions, definitions and conditions, that the result is con-
founding almost to the point of intelligibleness [sic]. To de-
scribe the policy as ambiguous is a substantial under-
statement."
Most courts took a more pragmatic approach to the problem
but, nevertheless, found the policy ambiguous.3 2 They empha-
sized that the policies employed such terms as "Products,"3
29. 174 F. Supp. at 653-54.
30. 1 R. LONG, supra note 12, § 11.01.
31. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Aconomy Erectors, 224 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir.
1955).
32. See Nielson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 174 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Iowa 1959), aff'd,
277 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1960); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Addison, 169 So. 2d 877 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Kendrick v. Mason, 234 La. 271, 99 So. 2d 108 (1958); Morris v.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); McAllister v. Century
Indem. Co., 24 N.J. Super. 289, 94 A.2d 345 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd mem., 12 N.J.
395, 97 A.2d 160 (1953).
33. See McAllister v. Century Indem. Co., 24 N.J. Super. 289, 94 A.2d 345 (Super.
Ct. App. Div.), aff'd mem., 12 N.J. 395, 97 A.2d 160 (1953)(holding excavator's liability
insurance was not offered under the heading "Products").
[Vol. 31
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"Products Hazard, ' 34 "Products-Completed Operations, '3 1 or
"Product (including completed operations) Hazard" 3 and inter-
preted this as intending to exclude the completed operations of
an insured whose business activities did not involve products
whatsoever." Other factors that the courts noted in finding am-
biguity included: (1) the adjunctive arrangement between "comr-
pleted operations" and "products"; 3 (2) the fact that the com-
pleted-operations hazard was tied in by format and premium
charge with the products hazard in the description-of-risks sec-
tion of the policy;3 9 (3) the inability to provide coverage for com-
pleted operations without also insuring products liability;") (4)
the use of the singular and not the plural in the term prod-
ucts-completed operations "Hazard"; 4' (5) the fact that the
premium for "Products-Hazard" coverage was calculated prima-
rily by the gross receipts for all products sold in the previous
year;4 2 and (6) the fact that the policy is worded and arranged so
that a reasonable person would be led to believe that coverage
was provided for completed operations.43 These decisions were
perplexing to the draftsmen who rightfully felt that they clearly
had defined the scope and purpose of completed-operations cov-
erage. Irrespective of the reasoning underlying these decisions,
one writer summarized these "anomalous" rulings as simply the
result of an uninformed judiciary who are concerned with insur-
e
34. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d
679, 433 P.2d 174, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1967).
35. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough, 105 N.H. 76, 193 A.2d 444 (1963).
36. See Clements v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 15 Ohio Misc. 252, 236 N.E.2d 799 (C.
P. Hamilton County 1968).
37. [1979] 1 PROD. LIB. REP. (CCH) 3540. See also New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
Addison, 169 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), in which it was held that the "Prod-
ucts Liability-Completed Operations Hazard" exclusionary clause had application only
if the insured was a manufacturer of products, and not when the insured is a general
electrical contractor engaged in rendering services.
38. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Addison, 169 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
39. McNally v. American States Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1962).
40. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough, 105 N.H. 76, 193 A.2d 444 (1963). See 1 R. LONG,
supra note 12, § 11.07A.
41. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Addison, 169 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
42. Morris v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
43. Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679,
433 P.2d 174, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1967). In McNally v. American States Ins. Co., 308 F.2d
438 (6th Cir. 1962) it was stated that "[wle are not persuaded that the average business-
man would be unreasonable or lacking in understanding in assuming that the caption
phrase "Products-Completed Operations" related to the subject of products liability
and that the subdivisions thereof were both germane to such subject. Id. at 443.
1980] 725
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ance coverage problems in only a very small percentage of cases
and the result of the doctrine that any ambiguity in an insurance
policy is to be resolved against the insurer.4
Nevertheless, the majority of courts that were faced with
this coverage question held that the completed-operations provi-
sion did not apply to an insured's business if it involved purely
service operations.45 Some courts took an' additional step and
held that the completed-operations clause did not include a ser-
vice that was only remotely related to a product." Similarly, if
the business of the insured could be severed into operations not
related to a product, only those operations that involved a prod-
uct were subject to the completed-operations exclusion.47 These
decisions violated a cardinal principle of contract law, for they
not only ignored the express language of the "operations" defini-
tion under "Products Hazard," but also rendered nugatory the
whole definition of "completed operations" when considered in
light of the activities of an insured clearly engaged in an "opera-
tion."4 The better view, and one more in line with the intent of
the policy drafters, was taken by only a handful of courts, which
held that the completed operations provision covered all types of
operations regardless of the involvement of a product.49
The courts that held either of the subdivisions of "Products
Hazard" inapplicable in a given case had to face an additional
coverage issue concerning what categories of property damage
were covered by the policy. The pre-1966 policies contained a
clause excluding coverage for:
Injury to or destruction of. . .any goods or products manufac-
tured, sold, handled or distributed or premises alienated by the
44. Sorensen, supra note 10, at 645.
45. Hendersen, supra note 6, at 423 & n.30.
46. Insurance Co. of North America v. Electronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679,
433 P.2d 174, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1967).
47. McNally v. American States Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 438, 445-46 (6th Cir. 1962); Bitu-
minous Cas. Corp. v. R & 0 Elevator Co., 293 F.2d 179, 185 (8th Cir. 1961); Gehrlin Tire
Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd 348 F.2d 918
(3d Cir. 1965).
48. Newmann v. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co., 27 Wis. 2d 410, 134 N.W.2d 474 (1965).
49. Hendersen, supra note 6, at 424. See Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 397 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1968)(drill repair service); Orchard v. Argricultural Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 564 (D.
Or. 1964)(auto parts); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Snow, 222 F. Supp. 892 (D. Or. 1963);
Clauss v. American Auto. & Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 641 (D. Pa. 1959); American Policy-
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named insured, on work completed by or for the named in-
sured, out of which the accident arises. 5
This clause indicated the intent of the drafters to insure personal
injury or property damage to others, caused by workmanship de-
fects in the insured's product, but not losses arising from cus-
tomer complaints that the product is worthless or lacking in
quality.5' In essence, it constituted a deductible feature-the de-
duction being the amount of the overall claim that represented
the damage done to the insured's own product or workmanship.
The courts had no problem applying this provision when the
product, as an undivided whole, was defective. 2 Nor was there
any lack of uniformity in application of the exclusionary clause
when, because of defects in products, property damage resulted
to things other than products handled by the insured. The in-
surer was held liable for all property damage except that to the
product itself.
5 3
An interesting problem did arise, however, in the applica-
tion of this exclusionary clause to situations in which a product
consisted of several component parts, and a defect in only one of
these components resulted in damage to the entire product. Was
the exclusionary clause intended to exclude coverage for the de-
fective component while holding the insurer liable for the dam-
age to the remainder of the product, or was it intended to ex-
clude coverage for the damage to the total product? Even the
insurance underwriters could not agree on the answer to this
question.54 One court, noting this ambiguity, proceeded from the
50. [1979] 1 PROD. LuB. REP. (CCH) 3550.
51. Andersen, supra note 8, at 443.
52. See Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 179 So. 2d 496 (La. Ct.
of App. 1965).
53. See Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334
P.2d 881 (1959) and Hauenstein v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65
N.W.2d 122 (1954), in which the insurers additionally were held liable for the costs in-
curred by the insureds in removing the defective products, contrary to the purpose of the
exclusionary language. This position has been abandoned in the interpretation of the re-
vised policy. E.g., Biebel Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 552 F.2d 1207
(8th Cir. 1975); Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 29 Ill. App.
3d 998, 331 N.E.2d 203 (1975).
54. In Volf v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 50 Cal. 2d 373, 325 P.2d 987 (1958), Justice
Carter, in his dissent, noted that a publication of the National Underwriters Co. stated,
regarding this issue, that "it is not clear whether the exclusion would deny coverage for
damage to the entire piece of equipment or only to the portion causing the damage." Id.
at 380, 325 P.2d at 992 (Carter, J., dissenting).
1980] 727
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principle that exclusionary clauses are to be strictly construed
against the insurer, and held that the entire structure, although
totally built by the insured, was not the "product" excluded by
the policy language. Rather, the clause was held to exclude only
damage to the component part that caused the accident.15 Sev-
eral other courts adopted this position, although not directly,
finding that it was not an unreasonable interpretation of the lan-
guage that referred to goods or to work out of which an accident
arises. " Nevertheless, this interpretation contradicted the intent
of the drafters, which was to exclude coverage on the entire prod-
uct, not just the part that failed.
57
As the field of products liability became increasingly com-
plex, courts were forever seeking expeditious, uniform ways of
handling the difficult and often novel issues with which they
were faced. In the area of products liability insurance, they uni-
formly applied the maxim that any ambiguity in the policy lan-
guage was to be construed against the insurer. Yet, with judicial
findings of widespread ambiguity in areas such as completed-op-
erations coverage, the insurance industry was left unable to pre-
dict the risks that were being covered, and were therefore liable
in many situations in which they did not intend to provide cov-
erage. Courts" and commentators 9 recognized the need for a re-
vision of the standard products liability policy in order to lessen
the confusion and anomolies resulting from the courts' decisions.
The industry responded in 1966 with the revised comprehensive
general liability policy.
65. S.L. Rowland Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 72 Wash. 2d 682,
434 P.2d 725 (1967).
56. Blackfield v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 245 Cal. App. 2d 271, 53 Cal. Rptr. 838
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See Liberty Bldg. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 583,
346 P.2d 444, 2 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960), in which the building contractor,
who built the entire house, applied stucco that proved to be defective. The stucco was
held to be the "product" to which the exclusion applied. But see Pittsburgh Bridge &
Iron Works v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 311 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Kendall Plumb-
ing, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 189 Kan. 528, 370 P.2d 396 (1962).
57. Andersen, supra note 8, at 444.
58. E.g., Smedley Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 143 Conn. 510, 515-16, 123
A.2d 755, 758 (1956); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clough, 105 N.H. 76, 84, 193 A.2d 444, 450
(1963)(Lampron, J., dissenting).
59, E.g., Andersen, supra note 8, at 442-46.
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III. POST-1966 DEVELOPMENTS
A. Time of the Loss
An insurance policy, like most contracts, remains in effect
for a limited, specified period of time. Liability arising from the
manufacture or sale of products, however, is not so determina-
ble. A product manufacturer who places his goods in the stream
of commerce may face liability, unforeseen or unexpected when
the product was first distributed, 0 arising from that product's
defective design, defective condition or malfunction. With re-
spect to the insurance designed to cover such liability, it is
therefore necessary to analyze when the "loss" giving rise to the
liability occurs.
As already stated, the "products-hazard" provision excluded
coverage for the "handling or use of, the existence of any condi-
tion in . . .goods . . .if the accident occurs after the insured
has relinquished possession thereof."6' The question of exactly
when an "accident" occurred occasionally arose. Was it at the
time of the negligent act or at the time of the occurrence result-
ing in loss or damage? With products liability insurance, this is-
sue is an important one since damage may occur weeks, months
or even years after the wrongful act. In Lessak v. Metropolitan
Casualty Insurance Co. ,62 the insured unlawfully sold BB shot to
a minor, who subsequently injured another away from the in-
sured's premises. The court, noting that the policy did not define
the word "accident," construed the language to hold that the ac-
cident was not the occurrence of injury, but rather was the un-
lawful sale of the BB shot. 3 Because the sale occurred at the
insured's premises, coverage was provided under the insured's
"Premises and Operations" policy. One commentator attributes
this holding to the fact that injury or property damage must re-
sult from some defective condition in the product itself before
the product-hazard exclusion applies.64 Such an interpretation,
60. The proposed draft of the Uniform Product Liability Act provides that a "prod-
uct seller may be liable to a claimant for harm caused by the seller's product duiing the
useful safe life of that product. 'Useful safe life' refers to the time during which the prod-
uct reasonably can be expected to perform in a safe manner." 44 Fed. Reg. 2997 (1979).
61. [1979] 1 PROD. LuB. REp. (CCH) 3530. See note 22 and accompanying text
supra.
62. 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 730 (1958).
63. Id. at 158, 151 N.E.2d at 734.
64. [1979] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 3527.
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however, negates the use in the policy of the words "handling or
use of."
The rationale in Lessak, nevertheless, has been followed.65
Other courts in similar situations found the existence of two "ac-
cidents"-the first being the wrongful sale and the second being
the resulting injury. 6 Since the first "accident" occurred on the
premises, coverage was found. One court, however, recognized
the fallacy of this rationale when it stated:
Those cases, which rely upon treating a negligent sale as an
"accident" in order to find coverage under these circumstances,
import to the word something far beyond its normal, popular
meaning. In the ordinary affairs of life we would neither call
the sale of a product in violation of a statute an "accident," nor
reasonably expect others to do so. Such construction seems
constrained and labored.67
This interpretation appears to be the more practical of the ap-
proaches and appears to follow the intentions of the insurance
industry.
Under the Lessak line of decisions, however, the insurance
companies found themselves facing the possibility of covering
risk extending for undertermined periods, even years, after the
policy expires. In the 1966 revised standard policy, therefore, the
word "accident" was replaced by the word "occurrence," which
in turn has been defined as follows:
"Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or re-
peated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the stand-
point of the insured.6"
65. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 316 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1963). But
see Hagen Supply Corp. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 331 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1964).
66. See Athens v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 7 Mich. App. 414, 151 N.W.2d 846
(1967); Brant v. Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 4 Mich. App. 596, 145 N.W.2d 410 (1966).
67. Cobbins v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 53 Ill. 2d 285, 292, 290 N.E.2d
873, 877 (1972).
68. 1 R. LoNG, supra note 12, § 11.01 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This definition was first
added in 1966 and then revised in 1973. It is designed to emphasize the intent of the
policy draftsmen that, in situations involving a related series of events attributable to the
same factor, only one accident or occurrence has transpired and the policy limits are not
to be multiplied. Id.
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By including "accident" in the definition, the underwriters
sought to clarify their intent to provide coverage only for losses
occurring during the policy period.69 Not all courts, however,
have followed this intention. In Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Lyon,70 the Arkansas Supreme Court construed a pre-1966
policy nine years after the underwriters had sought to lessen crn-
fusion surrounding application of policy limits. The court in
Lyon nevertheless applied the Lessak rationale in a case involv-
ing the negligent sale of gunpowder to a minor. Since the sale
itself, and not a defective product, was the proximate cause of
the accident, the product-hazard exclusion was held inapplicable
and coverage was provided.7' The Lyon decision, among others,7"
illustrates the effect that pre-1966 cases still have on current de-
cisions of this nature.
An even greater deviation from the underwriters' intentions
was recently made by a New York court in Bernstein v. Crystal
Building Corp.73 Plaintiff Bernstein brought an action both
against the owner of a building (Crystal) in which she was a resi-
dent and against a plumber (Arcoy), claiming negligent installa-
tion of a sink faucet. While the building was being constructed,
Crystal had hired Arcoy as plumbing subcontractor, agreeing to
obtain for the latter liability insurance coverage. A revised stan-
dard policy was written by the insurer for the period September
14, 1967 to September 14, 1968, in which "completed opera-
tions-plumbing" coverage was included. Arcoy finished its "op-
erations" by the end of 1968, the policy was not renewed, and
plaintiff was injured on January 19, 1969. Crystal referred the
claim to the insurer, which denied coverage because the injuries
occurred after the policy had expired. Disregarding any limita-
tion of coverage within the policy, the court approached the issue
from an equity viewpoint: "Their [the insurer's] position ...
simply stated, is that if the insured 'negligently' installs a
plumbing fixture on a day within the policy period and the item
'holds' long enough so that no one is hurt until after the policy
period, they are no longer responsible under that policy. 7 Ques-
69. Sorensen, supra note 10, at 647.
70. 258 Ark. 802, 528 S.W.2d 932 (1975).
71. Id. at 811, 528 S.W.2d at 937.
72. E.g., W.N. Leslie, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 264 S.C. 408, 215 S.E.2d 448 (1975).
73. 86 Misc. 2d 885, 383 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. City Ct. 1976).
74. Id. at 888, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
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tioning why an insured would add completed-operations cover-
age if it did not extend beyond the policy period, the court in
Bernstein held that this endorsement was intended to cover situ-
ations such as the one before it. This approach, giving greater
weight to the expectations of the insured rather than to the clear
and unambiguous language in the policy, has been followed in
similar situations in other jurisdictions.
7
.
A question regarding time of loss occasionally may arise
with property damage, caused by a product, which fully mani-
fests itself long after the damage was initially discovered. This
question arose in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
American Insurance Co.7' The insured, Adams, manufactured
bricks that were used in the construction of a house. During the
time in question, Adams carried successive products liability in-
surance policies with three insurance companies. The bricks
chipped, flaked or broke during the policy periods of all three
insurers. The question arose whether each insurer was liable only
for a quantum of damage corresponding to the number of bricks
flaking during its period of coverage or whether the insurer dur-
ing whose period of coverage the damage was first discovered was
liable for all damage to the structure occurring thereafter, even
though such loss extended beyond its period of coverage. After
analyzing the word "occurrence," the court adopted the latter
position, holding that "property damage" occurs to the entire
structure in the policy period when the damage first becomes ap-
parent and is not equated with the amount of loss that may have
occurred in a given policy period.77 It follows from this decision
that the insurer providing coverage when the damage was first
discovered would have been equally liable for the entire loss even
if there had been no coverage at all during the periods of subse-
quent flaking.
There have been few decisions" directly construing the word
"occurrence" as defined in the revised standard policy. As in
75. See Atwood v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 116 N.H. 636, 365 A.2d 744 (1976).
But see Sandpiper Constr. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 348 So. 2d 379
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
76. 345 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
77. Id. at 271.
78. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 267 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1976); Oceanonic, Inc. v. Petroleum Distrib. Co., 280 So. 2d 874 (La. Ct. of
App. 1973); Singsaas v. Diederich, 307 Minn. 153, 238 N.W.2d 878 (1976); Boggs v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 S.C. 460, 252 S.E.2d 565 (1979). See also Scott v. Keever, 212 Kan.
719, 512 P.2d 346 (1973) (construing "accident" as an occurrence under the old policy).
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Travelers Insurance Co. v. C.J. Gayfer's & Co.,71 each court has
interpreted this policy language to mean that "an identifiable
event other than the causative negligence must take place during
the policy period." 8 This interpretation is in accord with the in-
tentions of the drafters and indicates that the revised definition
is clear and unambiguous. Although Bernstein represents a
unique approach to this issue, it is anticipated that as courts
become more accustomed to dealing with the revised policy, they
will recognize that the intention of the drafters to limit coverage
with respect to the time of the loss is clearly stated, and super-
sedes any contrary intention on the part of the insured.
B. Warranties
As already stated, the pre-1966 products-hazard provision
excluded coverage for a "warranty of goods or products manufac-
tured, sold, handled, or distributed by the named insured."', In
addressing the issue of negligent representations, the courts
formed two disparate lines of opinion. One group was reluctant
to consider a representation closely related to a sale or service as
a separate operation. These courts held that since the negligent
representation merged with the completed sale, coverage was ex-
cluded unless the insured had purchased the products-hazard
endorsement.8 Other decisions took the position that a negligent
representation was an "operation" that was not completed until
the representation itself was acted upon.-" In the same vein, one
court treated the negligent representation as "a new operation,
separate, complete and distinct from the original operation."8 '
The revised policy attempted to unify the lines of thought
regarding warranties and the scope of products liability insur-
ance coverage. One writer states that the revision removes war-
ranty cases from "operation." ' This statement is somewhat mis-
79. 366 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979):
80. Id. at 1202.
81. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
82. Cravens, Dargan & Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 594, 600, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 607, 612 (1972); American States Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 379 N.E.2d 510
(Ind. Ct. App. 1978). See also Oceanonics, Inc. v. Petroleum Distrib. Co., 280 So. 2d 874
(La. Ct. of App. 1973) (negligent failure to warn).
83. Reed Roller Bit Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 198 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1952);
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Snow, 222 F. Supp. 892 (D. Or. 1963).
84. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Snow, 222 F. Supp. 892, 900 (D. Or. 1963).
85. Sorensen, What A Lawyer Ought to Know About Products Liability Insurance
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leading since the new completed-operations hazard provision
excludes "reliance upon a representation or warranty made at
any time with respect [to operations]. '"S The warranty language
with respect to products and operations is clear and unambigu-
ous. It explicitly denies coverage for bodily injury arising out of
reliance on warranties made at any time with respect to an in-
sured's product when the injury occurs away from the insured's
premises and after the insured has relinquished possession of the
product. Likewise, bodily injuries arising out of representations
or warranties made with respect to the insured's operations are
excluded "when all operations have been performed by the in-
sured and when the injury occurs away from the insured's
premises.""7
The provision applies to implied as well as express warran-
ties."8 Furthermore, the "operation" is not extended by warran-
ties, nor is a representation an "operation" in itself.8 This point
is made clear by the language of the "completed operations haz-
ard" definition, which provides that "operations which may re-
quire . . . correction, repair or replacement because of any de-
fect or deficiency, but which are otherwise complete, shall be
deemed completed."'" Although the word "negligence" is not
specifically mentioned, it has been held that the words "arising
out of operations" and "arising out of the named insured's prod-
ucts" in the hazard definitions are "broad enough to exclude
bodily injury arising out of operations or products caused to be
defective or faulty by negligence." 9
It is significant in a products liability case that although
negligent representations and warranties are excluded from cov-
erage, injury resulting from failure to warn is not. 2 This state-
ment, however, must be qualified. Numerous courts have held
that when a defect exists in the product that causes the injury,
the mere allegation of failure to warn will not remove the action
Coverage, 1968 TRi LAwYERs GUIDE 322, 326.
86. Sorensen, supra note 10, at 646.
87. Jones v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 80 Wis. 2d 321, 330, 259 N.W.2d 70, 74 (1977).
88. Roberts v. P. & J. Boat Service, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 729, 734 (E.D. La. 1973).
89. Jones v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 80 Wis. 2d 321, 259 N.W.2d 70 (1977).
90. See Roberts v. P. & J. Boat Service, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 729, 732 (E.D. La. 1973).
91. Id. at 735.
92. Templet v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 341 So. 2d 1248 (La. Ct. of App. 1977);
Cooling v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 So. 2d 294 (La. Ct. of App. 1972).
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from the products-hazard exclusion. 3 The definitions of products
hazard and completed-operations hazard, however, do not men-
tion omissions or failure to warn when there is no affirmative
duty to do so. 9' Reasoning that the insurer could have expressly
excluded failure to warn if it so desired, courts have held that if
the injury results from a danger inherent in a product and the
danger does not constitute a defect, a cause of action for failure
to warn is not excluded by the products-hazard or completed-
operations provisions . 5 This is especially noteworthy to practi-
tioners who handle products liability cases since, to insure en-
forcement of a possible judgment, it is often crucial for a plain-
tiff to structure his case so that insurance coverage for the
defendant is maintained."
C. Products-Hazard Coverage
The 1966 revised comprehensive general liability policy sep-
arated the definition of "completed operations" and "products
hazard." The purpose of this physical separation was to circum-
vent the effect of the various decisions that disregarded the prod-
ucts-liability exclusion and thereby mandated coverage when the
insured did not deal in a product. The revised products-hazard
provision reads as follows:
"Products hazard" includes bodily injury and property damage
arising out of the named insured's products or reliance upon a
representation or warranty made at any time with respect
thereto, but only if the bodily injury or property damage occurs
away from the premises owned by or rented to the named in-
sured and after physical possession of such products has been
93. See Bitts v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 282 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1960);
Oceanonics, Inc. v. Petroleum Distrib. Co., 280 So. 2d 874 (La. Ct. of App. 1973); In-
ductotherm Corp. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 83 N.J. Super. 464, 200 A.2d 358
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964).
94. Templet v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 341 So. 2d 1248 (La. Ct. of App.
1977).
95. Id.; Cooling v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 So. 2d 294 (La. Ct. of
App. 1972).
96. If the plaintiff pleads and thereby comes within the scope of an exclusionary
clause contained in the policy, he will not jeopardize his cause of action since the defend-
ant is normally the insured rather than the insurer. If the insured is insolvent, however,
the plaintiff may find himself forced to institute a second action against the insurance com-
pany to recover the unpaid judgment. The suggestion in the text is designed to avoid the
necessity of a second action.
97. 1 R. LONG, supra note 12, § 11.07A.
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relinquished to others."
One commentator stated that it was the intention of the
drafters to dispel the confusion that resulted from court deci-
sions construing the old policy as providing two distinct cover-
ages." Products hazard and completed operations have been re-
garded as essentially different aspects of the same protection,
instead of as two distinct coverages. 1' Products-hazard coverage
fills the gap that remains after operations are complete. 0'
Such a convoluted explanation, however, in no way assists
the practitioner or broker who is attempting to advise a client
what coverage he needs to purchase. Since under the revised pol-
icy, products-hazard and completed-operations coverages, if de-
sired, must be specifically purchased "by so electing on the face
of the policy or by purchasing an endorsement which either adds
the coverage to or deletes the exclusion of the coverage under the
basic policy,"'0 2 must a dealer in products who also provides a
service purchase both to be adequately covered? It should not be
necessary for him to purchase both because the insured should
know whether he is engaged in an "operation" or whether he
deals in a "product" for the purposes of purchasing the right
coverage. Therefore, if and when he is forced to litigate a cover-
age question, he may be assured that the final adjudication will
be founded upon the language of the policy section under which
he intended his business activities to fall.
Where then should the dividing line be drawn between prod-
ucts and operations? One commentator has stated that product
hazard should include losses resulting from the possession, con-
sumption, or use away from the premises of products manufac-
tured, handled, or distributed by the insured, the possession of
which has been relinquished to others.' How broadly, however,
should this language be construed? To eliminate the often im-
possible task of determining whether the injury falls within a
risk arising out of the product itself, one writer feels that once
liability is established under tort law, if a product is the cause in
98. Id.
99. Sorensen, supra note 85, at 326.
100. Sorensen, supra note 10, at 648.
101. Id.
102. Hendersen, supra note 6, at 418.
103. Sorensen, supra note 85, at 326.
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fact of the injury, then one should look no further to determine
whether the loss falls within the products-hazard provision, pro-
vided the accident occurs after the insured has relinquished pos-
session of the product and occurs away from the premises.10 A
supplier of products should be covered for business-related risks
if he elects product-hazard coverage and understands that he has
no such coverage if he refuses it.115 Completed operations, on the
other hand, would provide coverage for those businesses not
dealing in "products."
This interpretation, although theoretically simple, certainly
would clear up much of the confusion that for years has sur-
rounded products liability insurance. Courts, however, for the
most part have chosen not to adopt this simplified approach. Of
course, there is hardly a problem if the insured is merely a
wholesaler or retailer of products and engages in no service oper-
ations.'06 When the insured's business involves not only the han-
dling of products, but also the furnishing of a service, however
minimal, the analysis has not been so clear. In Novak v. All City
Insurance Co., ' plaintiff previously had recovered a judgment
against the insured, a restaurant, for injuries she sustained from
eating adulterated food. When this judgment went unpaid, she
sought recovery from the restaurant's liability carrier. The res-
taurant clearly provided products (food) and operations (ser-
vice). The court, holding that coverage was excluded, based its
decision on a policy provision that excluded coverage for bodily
injury "arising out of the named insured's products."'0 8 The sig-
nificance of the opinion is that the court did not even address
the fact that operations had been completed.
The approach taken by other courts, however, has been to
the contrary. In Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Scott,' 9 the
insured was a dealer of liquid nitrogen, which was purchased
from chemical companies and was used as fertilizer. The nitro-
gen was delivered by the chemical companies and stored in a
104. Hendersen, supra note 6, at 428 n.48.
105. Id. at 429.
106. See Timberline Equip. Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281 Or. 639,
576 P.2d 1244 (1978); Templet v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 341 So. 2d 1248 (La. Ct.
of App. 1977).
107. 43 N.Y.2d 854, 374 N.E.2d 127, 403 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1978).
108. Id. at 855, 374 N.E.2d at 127, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
109. 28 Ala. 159, 266 So. 2d 602 (1972).
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central storage tank located on the insured's premises. When a
customer desired to purchase fertilizer, the liquid was trans-
ferred from the central tank to 1,000 gallon "nurse tanks" owned
by the insured. These latter tanks were attached to trailers that
were used to transport the product to the particular location
where it was to be used. The court noted that on some occasions
the insured would tow the nurse tanks to customers' farms."10
The cost of the nitrogen was determined by computing the
weight difference in the nurse tank before the customer took it
out and after he returned it. Plaintiff in Scott had transported
the nitrogen to his farm by his own truck. As he was transferring
the liquid from the tank to the applicator, the transfer hose rup-
tured, causing the acidic fluid to spray into his eyes.
The insured in Scott had purchased neither products-hazard
nor completed-operations coverage. Clearly, coverage should
have been excluded under the products-hazard exclusion. The
injury resulted from the use of a product handled or distributed
by the insured, away from the insured premises and after posses-
sion of the nitrogen had been relinquished to the plaintiff. The
Alabama court, however, approached the coverage issue from the
standpoint of the completed-operations provisions, noting that
the insured's "operation" pertaining to the nitrogen involved the
furnishing of equipment."' It held that since the final weigh-in
had not yet been accomplished and the "work" had not been put
to its intended use (the nitrogen was not yet fertilizing the
crops), the operations were not complete at the time of the in-
jury. The completed-operations exclusion was therefore inappli-
cable and the insurer was held obligated to defend and indem-
nify."' Numerous other courts have engaged in similar
analyses."'
As evidenced by the foregoing discussion, courts have made
little or no attempt to establish a dividing line between "prod-
110. Id. at 161, 266 So. 2d at 604.
111. Id. at 164, 266 So. 2d at 607.
112. Id. at 166, 266 So. 2d at 609.
113. E.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 493 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1974) (sale and instal-
lation of gas heater); Weiss v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 59 Ill. 2d 165, 319 N.E.2d 491
(1974)(sale and loading of scrap magnesium); Whitten Oil, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 112 N.H. 257, 293 A.2d 757 (1972)(sale and installation of gas tank); Jones v. Sears
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ucts" and "operations.""' It may be safe to say that one dealing
primarily in products need only purchase products-hazard cover-
age. In light of the Scott decision and those following it, how-
ever, it is possible that an insured might elect products-hazard
coverage, only to have the court analyze the coverage issue under
the completed-operations provision, find that the operations
were complete, and thereby deny coverage. The insured must be
advised of this possibility, and if his business involves products
and operations to any appreciable degree, he should include both
products-hazard and completed-operations coverages in his lia-
bility policy package. Although this result seems somewhat ineq-
uitable,"' it is the only way that the insured can fully assure
himself of adequate coverage for the risks that he faces when his
products and/or services enter the stream of commerce.
D. Completed-Operations Coverage
Products liability insurance traditionally was not intended
to provide coverage for personal injury or property damage aris-
ing out of operations that occurred away from the insured's
premises and after operations had been completed." 6 The pre-
1966 policy, however, failed to define what constituted a "com-
pleted" operation, and the court decisions addressing this issue
took great pains to find that operations were incomplete. In Hey-
ward v. American Casualty Co.,"' plaintiff contracted to install
the plumbing and heating in a housing complex. As each unit
114. See Friestad v. Travelers Indem. Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. _ , 393 A.2d 1212
(1978).
115. The insurance underwriters, as part of their risk management, actually en-
courage most businesses to carry both coverages in an endeavor to avoid litigation, in
which they are obligated to defend the insured, concerning which particular coverage
applies. As a result, the premiums for product-hazard and completed-operations cover-
ages are rated according to the business activities being insured. For example, if the
business primarily involves the sale of products, and operations activities are limited, the
premiums for the latter are small per thousand as compared to those for products hazard.
Therefore, the conclusion reached above does not in reality pose a financial threat to a
small business attempting to make ends meet.
116. Most of the Comprehensive General Liability policies presently being issued,
following the 1973 standard policy restructuring, automatically include completed-opera-
tions and products-hazard coverages. The additional premiums have been added as a
part of the basic CGL premium. The insured may still choose between two coverages, but
to do so, he must have one or both excluded by endorsement. 1 R. LONG, supra note 12, §
11.01.
117. 129 F. Supp. 4 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
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became available for occupancy, the owner of the project rented
it to tenants. Before the entire project had been completed, an
explosion occurred in one of the completed units and injured the
tenants. The court held that since plaintiff had only one contract
for the plumbing and heating, which covered the entire project,
its "operations" were not complete."' The fact that the owner
saw fit to take over and attempt to use one or more units before
the project was completed did not affect the question of whether
plaintiff's operations had been completed."' Other courts have
used similar analyses in like situations.'
In addition to physically separating by eleven paragraphs 2 1
the definitions of "product hazard" and "completed operations
hazard," the 1966 revision clarified the situations in which oper-
ations are to be deemed completed. The present policy provides
that completion occurs at the earliest of the following times:
(1) when all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the
named insured under the contract have been completed,
(2) when all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the
insured at the site of the operations have been completed, or
(3) when the portion of the work out of which the injury or
damage arises has been put to its intended use by any person
or organization other than another contractor or subcontractor
engaged in performing operations for a principal as a part of
the same project. 1
22
It is important for both the insured and the insurer to know
on what basis courts will obligate the insurer to defend the in-
sured in a case in which the completed-operations provision is
involved. It is a well-settled principle of insurance law that an
insurer is obligated to defend an action against its insured if the
complaint filed against the insured alleges facts that are poten-
tially within the coverage of the policy.12r It would seem to follow
118. Id. at 10.
119. Id.
120. E.g., General Cas. Co. v. Larson, 196 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1952); Daniel v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 221 N.C. 75, 18 S.E.2d 819 (1942). The court in Daniel held "that
the work is complete within the meaning of the insurance contract so long as the work-
man has omitted or altogether failed to perform some substantial requirement essential
to its function, the performance of which the owner still has a contractual right to de-
mand." Id. at 77, 18 S.E.2d at 820.
121. 1 R. LONG, supra note 12, § 11.07.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Space Conditioning Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 294 F.
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that a complaint that merely alleges that operations were
incomplete at the time of injury potentially would render the
completed-operations provision inapplicable, thereby obligating
the insurer to provide defense for the insured. This result would
also expose the insurer to the potential obligation of satisfying a
subsequent adverse judgment. Two recent cases."' however, have
held to the contrary. In Weiss v. Bituminous Casualty Corp."' the
insured argued that since the complaint, in which he was the
named defendant, was silent about the scope of his contract for
services, the contract, and therefore the plaintiff's operations,
potentially were not completed, and the insurer was thereby
obligated to defend. In Shepard Marine Construction Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co."' plaintiff contended that its insurer was
required to provide defense since the complaint in the original
action alleged that the accident had occurred prior to the
completion of operations. In each case the court rejected the
insured's argument. The reasoning was stated aptly in Shepard:
Defendant cannot construct a formal fortress of the third
party's pleadings and retreat behind its walls. The pleadings are
malleable, changeable and amendable....
To restrict the defense obligation of the insurer to the
precise language of the pleadings would not only ignore the
thrust of the cases but would create an anomaly for the
insured. 2'
One writer has suggested that the insurer may, and often must,
look behind the third party's allegations to analyze whether,
under the facts pleaded, coverage is possible.'2
Courts that have construed the revised completed-opera-
tions hazard provision have uniformly found it clear and unam-
Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mich. 1968), afl'd, 419 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1970); McFadyen v. North
River Ins. Co., 62 Il. App. 2d 164, 209 N.E.2d 833 (1965); General Ins. Co. of America v.
Palmetto Bank, 268 S.C. 355, 233 S.E.2d 699 (1977); R. KEm2oN, BASIC TEXT ON INSUR-
ANCE LAw 426 (1971).
124. Weiss v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 59 111. 2d 165, 319 N.E.2d 491 (1974); Shepard
Marine Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 73 Mich. App. 62, 250 N.W.2d 541 (1977). But
see Ketona Chem. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 404 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968).
125. 59 Ill. 2d 165, 319 N.E.2d 491 (1974).
126. 73 Mich. App. 62, 250 N.W.2d 541 (1977).
127. Id. at 65, 250 N.W.2d at 542 (entire passage quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65
Cal. 2d 263, 276, 419 P.2d 168, 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 112 (1966)).
128. 14 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 51:47 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1978).
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biguous.19 The first two provisions defining when operations
shall be deemed complete are quite similar. Both state, in es-
sence, that an operation is complete when the named insured
has fully performed his job contract. The second provision, how-
ever, pertains to contracts that are to be performed at a particu-
lar job site, which is most often the case in the trade of a con-
tractor or builder.' 3° Under these definitions, temporary job
interruptions or delay while another trade finishes work would
not render operations "complete"; therefore, procurement of the
completed-operations hazard would not be required.'3 '
Immediately following the three "completion" clauses set
forth above, the completed-operations provision states that:
Operations which may require further service or maintenance
work, or correction, repair or replacement because of any defect
or deficiency, but which are otherwise complete, shall be
deemed completed.'32
This clause qualifies each of the three definitions of when an op-
eration is deemed completed. It raises an interesting and signifi-
cant question when considered in conjunction with the first defi-
nition. Does the completion of operations or fulfillment of
Qbligations under a contract require that the finished product ac-
tually perform as intended? In other words, is an operation com-
plete when the finished product actually functions properly, or
rather when it ought to function properly? The qualification
leads to the conclusion that operations are complete when the
finished product should work, since there is no time limitation
for when repair or replacement of defective work must be per-
formed. If repair or replacement may be made immediately after
the operation is "otherwise complete," then essentially there is
no requirement that the operation must ever actually work to be
"complete." This reasoning conflicts with that of the older line
of cases, although not addressing this precise issue, in which it
129. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. C.J. Gayfer & Co., 366 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Prieto v. Continental Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Ronald
Bouchard, Inc. v. Hartford Aec. & Indem. Co., 369 Mass. 846, 343 N.E.2d 372 (1976);
Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Kaye Milling Supply, Inc., 297 Minn. 348, 211 N.W.2d
519 (1973); Abco Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. 1977); Jones
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 80 Wis. 2d 321, 259 N.W.2d 70 (1977).
130. Sorensen, supra note 85, at 327.
131. Id.
132. Sorensen, supra note 10, at 646.
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was held that operations are incomplete if the insured "failed to
perform some substantial requirement essential to its function-
ing, the performance of which the owner still has a contractual
right to demand."'
' 33
This reasoning also is contrary to the holding of the only re-
cent case that has considered this particular question. In Abco
Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Federal Insurance Co.,' 34 plaintiff
entered into a contract in January 1971 to install a liquid-pro-
pane heating facility at a nearby plant. Abco designed the facil-
ity but obtained the components from other suppliers. All neces-
sary components were connected and installed, and it was
determined in August 1971 that the system was operable. In Oc-
tober 1971 the facility was checked and retested, resulting again
in a determination that all components were functioning. During
a third test in December, under colder conditions, the system
failed after brief use because of a defective vaporizer. In Febru-
ary 1972, when the manufacturer of this component was at-
tempting to adjust the vaporizer, the heating facility exploded,
causing substantial property damage to the plant. The vaporizer
was subsequently replaced and from that time on, the facility
functioned as required without mishap.
Abco had not purchased completed-operations hazard cover-
age. Defendant insurer denied coverage and contended that the
operations, which were otherwise complete, were not rendered in-
complete by the necessity of having to repair or replace the
vaporizer. The court disagreed, holding that Abco contracted to
install a heating facility that, when completed, would be (rather
than should be) capable of functioning as required.' 35 Since it
was not until after another vaporizer had been installed that the
facility could be used, it was not until then that Abco's opera-
tions were "completed" within the meaning of the policy.'36
Although this holding appears to contradict the language of
the completed-operations provisions, it illustrates a court's will-
ingness to twist the intentions of the insurer to find coverage for
the insured. The Abco decision, however, may be a signal that
the "repair or replacement" qualification needs further refining
133. Daniel v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 221 N.C. 75, 77, 18 S.E.2d 819, 820 (1942).
134. 550 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. 1977).
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to resolve the conflict with the first of the three completed-opera-
tions definitions.
The third definition under the completed-operations hazard
states that operations are deemed complete when the portion of
the work out of which the loss arises has been put to the use
intended. This clause was inserted partly in response to decisions
such as Heyward v. American Casualty Co.,'3 in which the court,
in rejecting the insurer's claim of exclusion, observed that the
insurer was in effect attempting to amend its policy to preclude
coverage "if the accident or occurrence takes place after any por-
tion or part of such operations have been completed."'38 The new
clause, however, also seems to have been based on the proposi-
tion that if there is a practical acceptance by the proprietor of a
product upon conclusion of the contractor's work, the liability of
the contractor to third persons ceases and the responsibility for
maintaining or using the product shifts to the proprietor.'39
The courts have, for the most part, sided with the insurer in
excluding coverage for the insured after the owner or a third
party has put the work product to its intended use. Courts have
done so even with construction work in commercial or public
buildings, "' and in businesses in which equipment is used while
construction is ongoing."' In Security Insurance Co. of Hartford
v. Kaye Milling Supply, Inc., "I the owner secured permission
from Kaye to dry a shipment of soybeans in a newly constructed
bin. Shortly after this bin was filled, a supporting leg collapsed,
dropping the tower, bin and grain dryer to the ground. More
than 450 man-hours of work remained before actual completion
of this particular bin. Additionally, there was evidence that per-
formance of some of this work might have prevented the acci-
dent. In denying coverage for the insured, the court noted that
137. 129 F. Supp. 4 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
138. Id. at 10.
139. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 252 Ark. 400, 403, 479
S.W.2d 232, 234 (1972). Cf. Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970)
(holding that in the sale of a new house by the builder-vendor, there arises an implied
warranty of habitability and good workmanship "irrespective of any fault" on the part of
the builder).
140. Casey v. Employers Nat. Ins. Co., 538 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)(when
the commercial building construction project was only 75 percent complete and the area
in which the injury occurred had been accepted and had been put to its intended use).
141. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Kaye Milling Supply, Inc., 297 Minn. 348, 211
N.W.2d 519 (1973).
142. 297 Minn. 348, 211 N.W.2d 519 (1973).
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the "damage did not arise out of negligence, incompetence, or
defects in the process of actually erecting the structure.
'1 3
Rather, the damage resulted from the precise "use" for which
the bins were constructed.'44 Along the same lines, another court
held that an operation that, after acceptance, results in property
damage is not rendered incomplete by the insured's failure to
install a particular component, if such failure bears no relation
to the accident.
4 5
This particular section of the completed-operations defini-
tions is one of the few areas in which courts faced with products
liability coverage issues have strictly construed the policy lan-
guage to find for the insurance company. In Martinez v. Villa
Construction Corp."'4 plaintiff's family moved into a new house
constructed by the defendant. Three months later, plaintiff, a
two-year-old child, pushed open the door at the bottom of the
basement stairs and entered the basement where gasoline was
stored. The gasoline ignited, causing the child to suffer serious
bums. It was undisputed that the door latch was negligently in-
stalled. The trial court, finding for the insured defendant, con-
cluded that the intended use of the door was to provide a barrier
against the entry of minor children into the basement. The door
failed to fulfill this use, rendering incomplete the work out of
which the accident arose. The appellate court reversed, noting
that basement doors serve purposes other than to provide a
child-proof barrier and that a properly working latch is only inci-
dental to the fulfillment of the purposes. 7 Holding that as a
"barrier" a door is also designed to be opened, "else a wall would
suffice,"'4 5 it denied coverage.
South Carolina, however, reached the opposite result in a
similar situation. In W.N. Leslie, Inc. v. Travelers Insurance
Co.,I9 the McDaniel family moved into a new house on January
143. Id. at 354, 211 N.W.2d at 522.
144. Id. See also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 493 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1974).
145. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Rothman, 331 So. 2d 81, 86 (La. Ct. of App. 1976).
146. 38 Colo. App. 302, 563 P.2d 954 (1976), aff'd sub nom, Martinez v. Hawkeye
Security Ins. Co., 576 P.2d 1017 (Colo. 1978).
147. 38 Colo. App. at 304, 563 P.2d at 956.
148. Id. The state supreme court agreed, stating "a door is a movable piece of firm
material or structure supported usually along one side and swinging on pivots or
hinges. . . by means of which an opening may be closed or kept open for passage into or
out of a . . . room . . . ." 576 P.2d at 1020 (emphasis in original).
149. 264 S.C. 408, 215 S.E.2d 448 (1975).
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24, 1967. Two days later, Mrs. McDaniel, while descending from
the attic, was injured when the folding stairway collapsed. It was
discovered that the upper end of the stairway had simply been
jammed into the stairwell frame without being attached by nail,
screw or bolt. W.N. Leslie, the insured contractor, settled the
suit with the injured woman and then instituted action seeking
reimbursement from its liability carrier. The contractor did not
have completed-operations coverage. The insurer contended that
since the stairway had been "put to its intended use," it was
"completed" within the policy language when the injury oc-
curred, and coverage was thereby excluded. The South Carolina
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the slight use to which
the stairway had been put prior to the injury was not its "in-
tended use" within the contemplation of the policy.1"0
The Kaye Milling and Martinez cases indicate a willingness
on the part of most courts to read the "intended use" clause lit-
erally and hold that any intended use of the operation brings the
insured within the third definition of the completed-operations
provision. Leslie, however, is the exception. Since this is the only
South Carolina case in which this revision"' of the standard
CGL policy has been construed, the insurance company attorney
should step lightly when entering a court of this state on a claim
involving completed-operations coverage.
As with the products-hazard clause, 5 2 it is possible in plead-
ing to circumvent the completed-operations provisions so that
the insured's coverage will be maintained. In situations involving
contractors or builders, one court has held that allegations of
negligence in supervising, maintaining and exercising control of
the premises under construction and allegations of the failure to
warn of a dangerous condition are "within the contemplated
150. Id. at 415, 215 S.E.2d at 451. It is interesting that, despite the language of the
third "completion" definition, the court in Leslie still charged the jury "that work is not
deemed completed within the meaning of an insurance contract so long as the workmen
have omitted or altogether failed to perform some substantial requirement essential to its
functioning, the performance of which the owner has a contractual right to demand." Id.
at 414, 215 S.E.2d at 450. See also Whitten Oil, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 112
N.H. 257, 293 A.2d 757 (1972).
151. Only two other South Carolina cases have addressed any of the other 1966 revi-
sions to the CGL standard policy. See Boggs v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 S.C. 460, 252
S.E.2d 565 (1979); General Ins. Co. of America v. Palmetto Bank, 268 S.C. 355, 233
S.E.2d 699 (1977). Both cases construed the work "occurrence."
152. See notes 92-96 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 31
29
Harvey: Products Liability Insurance Coverage
Published by Scholar Commons, 1980
PRODUCTS LIABILITY INSURANCE




It is not the purpose of products liability insurance to pro-
vide coverage for all property damage arising out of the insured's
products or operations. Rather, the insurance industry places
upon the insured, as a risk of doing business, the obligation to
repair or replace his own defective work or defective product.'
In this respect, the revised policy includes a provision that states
that the policy does not apply
(m) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of
the named insured arising out of the work or any portion
thereof, or out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in
connection therewith. 55
It has been noted that only damage arising out of the specified
causes is excluded from coverage by this provision. Damage aris-
ing in another manner is not.' With builders or general contrac-
tors, however, the entire structure is often the "work product,"
and therefore, any damage to the structure itself is not covered
by the insured's liability policy.5 ' This may generate confusion
among contractors who purchase completed-operations hazard
coverage with the belief that such coverage also insures their
completed structure. Damage to the insured's work product is
excluded from the policy altogether. Exclusion (m) does not cre-
ate an ambiguity when applied to completed operations.'58 The
work-product exclusion merely limits completed-operations cov-
erage to the extent that damage to the insured's completed work
does not fall within the policy's coverage. 5'
153. Kincaid v. Simmons, 66 App. Div. 2d 928, 414 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1979).
154. See Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 179 So. 2d 496, 497 (La.
Ct. of App. 1965).
155. Sorensen, supra note 10, at 647.
156. Slate Constr. Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 228 Pa. Super. 1, 323 A.2d 141
(1974).
157. See B.A. Green Constr. Co., Inc., v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 Kan. 393, 517
P.2d 563 (1973).
158. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Pole Bldgs., Inc., 478 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
159. Id.; Engine Service, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 474 (Wyo. 1971).
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Similarly, the revised policy includes a provision excluding
coverage for
(1) the property damage to the named insured's products aris-
ing out of such products or any part of such products.10
The italicized portion of this provision was added mainly in re-
sponse to earlier cases"' in which it was held that this exclusion
did not apply to the entire product if only a component part was
defective. These cases instead ruled that the provision applied
only to the component part that caused the accident. By adding
the words "or any part of such products," the underwriters
sought to emphasize that the exclusion applies to damage to the
whole product of the insured or to any part thereof. One recent
case has held that the 'rords "insured's products," as used in
this provision, refer to that in which the insured trades or deals,
and not all goods handled by an insured in the process of com-
pleting its business function.11
2
The decisions construing exclusion (1) have, for the most
part, recognized and followed the intentions of the underwrit-
ers. 3 There have, however, been exceptions. In Cotton States In-
surance Co. v. Diamond Housing Mobile Homes"4 a mobile
home sold by the insured was damaged by fire caused by a de-
fective furnace. Despite the revised language of provision (1), the
court found that it was unclear whether the exclusion applied
only to the part of the entity (the furnace) that caused the dam-
age or to the entire entity (the mobile home) that the insured
sold." ' Construing this ambiguity against the insurer, the court
held that the policy provided coverage for any property damage,
except for the value of the "product" within the mobile home
that caused the fire."' It is noteworthy that the Cotton States
decision relied heavily on the reasoning of earlier cases constru-
160. Sorensen, supra note 10, at 647 (emphasis added).
161. Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir.
1971); S.L. Rowland Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 72 Wash. 2d 682, 434
P.2d 725 (1967).
162. Paxton-Mitchell Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 279 Or. 607, 569 P.2d 581 (1977).
163. E.g., Biebel Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 522 F.2d 1207
(8th Cir. 1975); Adams Tree Serv. v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 117 Ariz. 385, 573 P.2d
76 (1977).
164. 430 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
165. Id. at 507.
166. Id. at 508.
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ing policies that did not include the term "or any part of such
products." The "damage to the work performed" and "damage
to the product" exclusions have, almost without exception,
presented no difficulty to the courts that have addressed them.
The Cotton States decision, however, illustrates the ever-present
possibility that a court will, in a given situation, find ambiguity
in the policy language and construe such ambiguity against the
insurer. The lawyer must always be mindful of this possibility
when evaluating the client's case.
B. The Business-Risk Exclusion
Neither the revised CGL policy, nor its predecessors, was
ever intended to provide coverage for business know-how.," The
1966 standard policy excluded coverage for:
(k) ...bodily injury or property damage resulting from the
failure of the named insured's products or work completed by
or for the named insured to perform the function or serve the
purpose intended by the named insured, if such failure is due
to a mistake or deficiency in any design, formula, plan, specifi-
cations, advertising material or printed instructions prepared
or developed by any insured; but this exclusion does not apply
to bodily injury or property damage resulting from the active
malfunction of such products or work."6s
One writer anticipated that the courts would find this provision
troublesome because it seems to restore products coverage taken
away by the clause that proceeds it.' 9 The New York Court of
Appeals agreed, stating that "[algain, 'active malfunctioning'
seems descriptive of all that is excluded from coverage. If under-
writers know what this so-called standard form clause means,
the average insured probably does not."'' 0
As a result of problems created by the ambiguity of the 1966
policy language, the business-risk exclusion was revised in 1973.
This exclusion, in its present form, provides as follows:
This policy does not apjlly to loss of use of tangible prop-
erty which has not been physically injured or destroyed result-
167. Sorensen, supra note 85, at 328.
168. Sorensen, supra note 10, at 647.
169. Sorensen, supra note 85, at 328.
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ing from (1) a delay in or lack of performance by or on behalf of
the named insured of any contract or agreement, or (2) the fail-
ure of the named insured's products or work performed by or on
behalf of the named insured to meet the level of performance,
quality, fitness or durability warranted or represented by the
named insured;
but this exclusion does not apply to loss of use of other tangible
property resulting from the sudden and accidental physical in-
jury to or destruction of the named insured's products or work
performed by or on behalf of the named insured after such
products or work have been put to use by any person or organi-
zation other than an insured.'
The exclusion is directed toward "loss of use" claims involv-
ing tangible property that has not been physically damaged. The
apparent intent of the drafters is that no distinction is to be
made between production errors by employees and design errors
by management. The exclusion, rather, is directed to areas of
"business risk" when the insured is the best judge of the risk
involved and should, accordingly, bear the loss.'
With respect to loss-of-use coverage, this revised exclusion
appears to provide for a broader scope of coverage than the 1966
policy.' There is little authority, however, upon which to base
this conclusion. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company
v. Cross,'4 decided in 1978, the California Court of Appeals held
that the business risk exclusion precluded coverage for a claim
brought by a homeowner against a contractor for, failure to con-
struct a home in a workmanlike manner. Although the defective
materials and workmanship concedely produced an inferior
home, giving rise to loss-of-use damages, the court ruled that
"poor workmanship on the delivered product is not 'property
damage' within the terms of the general comprehensive liability
policy.""' An analogous situation was presented in Hamilton Die
Cast, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company,'76 in
which a customer sued the insured for failing to comply with a
contract for tennis racket frames, which the insured had with-
171. 1 R. LONG, supra note 12, § 11.10.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 80 Cal. App. 3d 888. 145 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1978).
175. Id. at 894, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
176. 508 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1975).
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drawn from the market because of design defects. Arguably, this
could be viewed as property damage within the terms of the
CGL insurance policy, since the finished product (the tennis
racket) was damaged by reason of the incorporation of the defec-
tive part (the frame). The Seventh Circuit rejected this conten-
tion, however, and required a stricter showing of physical
harm."'
In contrast, in International Hormones v. Safeco Insurance
Company of America,"7 s the insured, a manufacturer of hormone
suspensions, had sold defective suspensions resulting in a Food
and Drug Administration-ordered recall of a third party's prod-
uct. The New York Supreme Court held that the exclusion did
not apply "where the product has become a part of, or has been
integrated into, another product of a third party."'79 This diver-
gence of opinion among the courts apparently results from the
degree of strictness used in construing the policy terms. The New
York view is certainly justifiable, since a product that has a de-
fective component incorporated into it is clearly physically dam-
aged. At the same time, however, the California and Seventh
Circuit view that a defective part that causes no further physical
damage is not sufficient to escape the exclusionary clause is
clearly warranted by a strict reading of the policy.
Other courts have faced this issue in construing the "active
malfunction?' requirement of 1966 policy,'"0 under which design
errors resulting in mere passive failure of the insured's product
to perform as intended are regarded as the insured's normal bus-
iness risk and are excluded from coverage, while design errors
that cause some positive or active harm (designated as "active
malfunction"), deemed extraordinary in the insured's business,
are covered.'' Some of the hypotheticals appearing in the com-
mentaries'12 dealing with this provision show that the policy is
not intended to cover liability resulting from the faulty design of
an insecticide that fails to kill insects, a hair tonic that fails to
177. Id. at 419.
178. 57 App. Div. 2d 857, 394 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1977).
179. Id. at 857, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
180. See note 168 and accompanying text supra.
181. American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 509 F.2d 128, 130 (1st Cir.
1975). See also 1,R. LONG, supra note 12, § 11.10; Hendersen, supra note 6, at 440.
182. See, e.g., 1 R. LONG, supra note 12, § 11.10; Elliott, supra note 11; Sorensen,
supra note 10; Sorensen, supra note 85; Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some
of the Changes, 33 INs. CouNsEL J. 223 (1966).
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prevent baldness, or a rust inhibitor that fails to inhibit rust.5 3
On the other hand, the active malfunction exception is intended
to apply to provide coverage for liability resulting from an insec-
ticide that harms crops, a hair tonic that causes a scalp rash, or
a rust inhibitor that corrodes a radiator to which it is applied., 4
The question arises whether any physical damage to prop-
erty other than the insured's products or work product will con-
stitute an active malfunction. In Haugan v. Home Indemnity
Co.,' s the plaintiff designed and constructed an airplane hanger,
the foundation of which cracked. Denying coverage, the court
applied exclusion (m) (excluding damage to the work per-
formed). In dictum, however, it was stated:
The same reasoning and the same result applies to the ex-
ception relating to "active malfunctioning" of products or work
appearing in exclusion (k). This exception is likewise limited
by the basic exclusion (m). It means there is no liability cover-
age afforded by the policies for damages caused by and con-
fined to the insured's own work or product. However, when the
insured's work or product actively malfunctions and causes
damage to other property coverage is afforded.' 6
Similarly, in Kyllo v. Northland Chemical Co.' 7 the court held
the active-malfunction exception inapplicable absent "actual
physical damage caused by the application of the product."'
8
Despite the language of these cases, one court has stated that
while physical damage to property other than the insured's prod-
uct or work is necessary for a finding of active malfunctioning,
the mere showing of such damage is not in itself sufficient to
come within this exception to exclusion (k).' s
183. See American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 509 F.2d 128, 130 (1st
Cir. 1975).
184. Id.
185. 86 S.D. 406, 197 N.W.2d 18 (1972).
186. Id. at 413, 197 N.W.2d at 22. It would seem to follow that the same reasoning
applies to the active malfunctioning of the insured's products and exclusion (1) (damage-
to-the-product exclusion).
187. 209 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1973).
188. Id. at 632.
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C. The "Sistership" Exclusion
Although products liability insurance covers damages for
bodily injuries and property damage caused by the insured's
product that was defective or that failed, it was never intended
that the insurer would be saddled with the cost of preventing
such defects or failures.""° In an attempt to exciude such cover-
age, the 1966 standard policy revision added exclusion (n), the
"sistership" exclusion, which provides that the policy does not
apply
(n) to damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, repair,
replacement, or loss of use of the named insured's products or
work completed by or for the named insured or of any property
of which such product or work form a part, if such products,
work or property are withdrawn from the market or from use
because of any known or suspected defect or deficiency
therein."'
It is clear that if the insured suspects that all or a portion of his
products may be defective and thus constitutes a potential
source of injury, the cost of and any liability resulting from his
withdrawal of such products from the market is excluded from
coverage .12
A problem has arisen, however, when a third party has in-
corporated the insured's product as a component in a larger
product. When the insured's component fails or proves defective,
the third party is forced to withdraw and correct the defect in
the larger product, and subsequently brings suit against the in-
sured for the costs and resulting liability. The courts are split on
whether coverage for liability incurred by the insured in this sit-
uation is 'excluded under provision (n). One line of cases has
taken the position that the exclusion applies only if the with-
drawal is instituted by the insured himself.9 3 When the product
190. 1 R. LONG, supa note 12, § 11.11.
191. Id. Indeed, the provision makes it a condition of the insurer's liability that the
insured "promptly take at his expense all reasonable steps to prevent other bodily injury
or property damage from arising out of the same or similar conditions, but such expense
shall not be recoverable under this policy." Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356, 361, 314 N.E.2d 37, 38, 357 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (1974).
192. Elliott, supra note 11, at 12-9. See also International Hormones, Inc. v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of America, 57 App. Div. 2d 857, 394 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1977).
193. See Arcos Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Pa.
1972); International Hormones, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 57 App. Div. 2d 860,
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is recalled by a third party, the exclusion is inapplicable and
coverage is maintained. In so holding, the New York Court of
Appeals, in Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., '4 noted that to do otherwise would render products liability
coverage nearly illusory:
It is persuasive that the obvious intent of Gioia [the in-
sured] and Liberty Mutual [the insurer] . . . was to afford
Gioia substantial economic protection from exposure to claims
of third parties against Gioia in consequence of defects in
Gioia's products. To say that the categories of damages
claimed here by Lipton [the third-party recaller] do not fall
within such coverage would appear to exclude what, as a prac-
tical matter, would usually be some of the largest foreseeable
elements of such damage.1
95
Moreover, finding ambiguity in the construction urged by the in-
surer, the court held the exclusion inapplicable.
Other courts, however, have found it immaterial that the
withdrawal was not made by the insured. 9' It is noteworthy that
in Elco Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,'57 the
court stated that, regardless of who institutes the recall, the
component must be so intertwined with the product into which
it is incorporated that the component's defect and subsequent
repair or replacement necessarily results in damage to the com-
pleted product.' If the recall and repair of the defective compo-
nent do not require expenditures greater than those necessary
merely to replace the component itself, and the defective part
results in no damage to other parts of the larger product, the
court in Elco suggested that exclusion (n) would be
inapplicable.'
It follows from these decisions that, if the insured discovers
defects in his products, it may necessarily be to his advantage to
394 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1977); Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356,
314 N.E.2d 37, 357 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1974).
194. 34 N.Y.2d 356, 314 N.E.2d 37, 357 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1974).
195. Id. at 362, 314 N.E.2d at 39, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
196. Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 508 F.2d 417
(7th Cir. 1975). See also Elco Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d 936,
361 N.E.2d 589 (1977).
197. 46 I1. App. 3d 936, 361 N.E.2d 589 (1977).
198. Id. at 939, 361 N.E.2d at 591.
199. Id., 361 N.E.2d at 591-92. See also Arcos Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 350 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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sit back and allow a third party higher on the retail chain to
institute the product's recall. If the insured withdraws the prod-
uct, he unquestionably will bear the expense and "damages
claimed" resulting from the withdrawal, since coverage for such
liability is clearly excluded by exclusion (n). If he waits for a
third party to initiate the recall, he still faces a risk that is
equally great. Depending on the jurisdiction, however, there is
the possibility that the court will find exclusion (n) inapplicable
and the insurer will be bound to pay the judgment. As indicated
by the conditions in some policies that the insured "shall
promptly take at his expense all reasonable steps to prevent
other bodily injury or damage from arising out of the same or
similar conditions, '"20 this inaction by the insured evidently is
not what the "sistership" exclusion was intended to elicit. This
conclusion again may intimate that the standard policy needs
further revision to clarify the intention of the underwriters.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1966 revision of the standard comprehensive general lia-
bility policy sought to reduce the confusion and ambiguity that
for years had surrounded the interpretation of prior policies. To
a large extent, this purpose was accomplished. In so doing, how-
ever, the underwriters created certain new problems related to
the scope of coverage provided by the revised policy. The pur-
pose of this Note has been to delineate the approaches that the
courts have taken in confronting these problems, and the ways
that they have been resolved. Defense attorneys and house coun-
sel owe it to their clients to recognize policy coverage questions
and to see that their clients secure and pay for only the coverage
they need. Plaintiff's lawyers likewise have a duty to their clients
to recognize the legal theories that have proven successful when
these coverage questions have been litigated. It is hoped that
this article will be of some assistance to the bar in fulfilling these
obligations.
William Brantley Harvey, III
200. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356, 361, 314
N.E.2d 37, 38, 357 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (1974).
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